Dwi Rendra Adi Putrawijaya

Magister Akuntansi Universitas Airlangga

Ni Wayan Sulastri

Magister Akuntansi Universitas Airlangga

Basuki

Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis Universitas Airlangga

DOI: https://doi.org/10.19184/jauj.v15i1.6874 

ABSTRACT 

The ultimate objective of this study is to describe a big picture of managerial honesty research that had been done in last decade. Moreover, the result of this research is aiming to provide an opportunity to continue the research on this particular topic. This archival study was held based on 21 research subjecting in managerial honesty, particularly in budgeting.Research that can be developed in this sphere is related to economic and psychological factors that affect conflict within the organization. Specifically, this research plan seeks to outline the economic and psychological factors affecting the competition. Furthermore, the research plan seeks to distinguish models from the competition and analyze their impact on management tendencies in conducting honesty in addition to economic incentives to lie. The model is here: first, the model that involves economic pressures and the second is a model that raises competition among participants without changing the number of monetary incentives.

Keywords: Managerial Honesty, Budgetary Slack, Honesty on Budgeting

ABSTRAK

Tujuan utama studi ini adalah untuk menggambarkan gambaran besar penelitian kejujuran manajerial yang telah dilakukan dalam dekade terakhir. Lebih jauh lagi, hasil penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memberikan kesempatan untuk melanjutkan penelitian pada topik khusus ini. Studi arsip ini dilakukan berdasarkan 21 penelitian yang membahas kejujuran manajerial, khususnya dalam penganggaran. Penelitian yang dapat dikembangkan di bidang ini berkaitan dengan faktor ekonomi dan psikologis yang memengaruhi konflik dalam organisasi. Secara khusus, rencana penelitian ini berupaya untuk menguraikan faktor ekonomi dan psikologis yang memengaruhi persaingan. Selanjutnya, rencana penelitian ini berupaya untuk membedakan model-model dari persaingan dan menganalisis dampaknya terhadap kecenderungan manajemen dalam melakukan kejujuran di samping insentif ekonomi untuk berbohong. Model yang digunakan di sini adalah: pertama, model yang melibatkan tekanan ekonomi dan kedua adalah model yang meningkatkan persaingan antar peserta tanpa mengubah jumlah insentif moneter.

Keywords: Kejujuran Manajerial, Kelonggaran Anggaran, Kejujuran dalam Penganggaran

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